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May faced a choice between a fantasy Brexit, designed only to gratify a 
minority who are immune to gratification, and real Brexits that require 
compromise on every side. It wasn’t an appealing decision, but nor was it a 
hard one. (Behr, 2018) 
There has been an outpouring of journalistic and academic writing that has used 
the idea of fantasy to describe and critique Brexit (see, for example, Gearty, 2016; 
Nawratek, 2017; Newbigin, 2017; Eaglestone, 2018; Shariatmardi, 2018). It has 
been one widely used figure through which to address both the political leadership 
(of the campaign to leave and of the Conservative Party in government) and the 
popular support for Leave. Much of the time, ‘fantasy’ has been deployed as an 
image driven by liberal scepticism – denoting the apparently ill-informed, 
misguided and potentially disastrous project of leaving the EU. It has been 
frequently expressed in the image of searching for ‘unicorns’ as a way of 
registering the triumph of fantasy and desire over rationality (e.g., Rigby, 2019). 
It is not the aim here to treat fantasy in these terms, as marking a politics that is 
explicitly or implicitly contrasted with hard-headed realism or rational political 
decision-making. Too much of the debate around Brexit has found it convenient 
to dismiss the vote to leave in such terms. However, this does not mean 
abandoning the idea of fantasy: this chapter is more interested in how fantasy 
may be a productive way of thinking about processes of political articulation and 
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mobilisation – offering a means of addressing projections and promises that find 
political purchase. The chapter certainly does not assume that only the Leave 
campaign traded in affective politics that involved the use of collective fantasies: 
the campaign to remain was dubbed ‘Project Fear’ by the Leave campaign for good 
reason, and contrasted the projected economic misery outside the EU with images 
of other empowered (largely consumerist) futures for UK citizens should they 
make the ‘reasonable’ choice. 
In the context of Brexit, then, one might pay attention to specific aspects of 
political-cultural fantasy work that project a double dynamic of loss and 
restoration; examples of what Paul Gilroy has described as melancholia, borrowing 
and adapting the term from Freud to explore the postcolonial condition in Britain. 
He suggests that the condition of postcolonial melancholia results from the 
country’s refusal to face up to the end of an empire that was foundational for its 
economic, social and political arrangements. Rather than the collective culture 
working through this sense of loss, Britain refuses to address both the history of 
empire (except as a mercantilist and a civilising project) and the implications of 
its loss. Instead, he argues, Britain is trapped in a collective pathology which 
manifests itself in mood swings that switch from ‘racist violence [as] an easy 
means to ‘purify’ and re-homogenize the nation’ that is the condition for ‘shame-
faced tides of self-scrutiny and self-loathing’, interrupted by ‘outbursts of manic 
euphoria’ of national celebration (Gilroy, 2004, p. 102). As Gary Younge (2016) 
among others has claimed this long history is intertwined with the promise of 
Brexit: the restoration of (imperial) greatness, the celebration of a sovereign 
nation and the recovery of a lost ‘way of life’. 
This chapter explores the central place that ideas of British sovereignty played in 
the referendum campaign and its aftermath. In particular, it shows how the 
conception of the nation as a sovereign people was central to the political 
mobilisation through the promise to ‘take back control’ and how this idea has 
persisted as a key reference point for continuing conflicts over Brexit. This promise 
to ‘take back control’ acted as a representation of collective agency, evoking an 
idea of restoring power to the people in a variety of ways. This has formed a potent 
but troubling coupling of fantasy (as a mode of political mobilisation) and agency, 
making the projection of collective agency vital for the political alignments that 
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the campaign to leave the EU constructed. Subsequently, the chapter examines 
the disjuncture that emerged between the distinctive populist temporality of the 
Leave campaign (the promise of immediate liberation) and the return of 
governmental temporality (the long march through the institutions). In doing so, 
it draws on and develops Taguieff’s insight that populist political discourse 
suspends time in favour of a continuous present (2007). By contrast, the 
negotiation of Brexit has restored different temporalities (of negotiation, of 
constitutional reform, of parliamentary debate and more). In this process, the 
fantasy of the sovereign people and Brexit as an expression of collective agency 
has continued to play a central role in the denunciation of delay, doubt and 
dissent. 
A sovereign people? 
The political conflict over the UK’s membership of the EU articulated around the 
2016 referendum was dominated by questions of sovereignty, particularly the 
Leave campaign’s desire to bring about a restoration of political sovereignty from 
Brussels to Westminster. Sovereignty has emerged as a contemporary keyword 
in response to the dynamics of its displacement, rearrangement and disciplining 
by transnational dynamics, most evidently those driven by neo-liberal 
globalisation. Wendy Brown has argued that:  
While it is no news that nation-state sovereignty is challenged by global 
movements of capital and the growing power of transnational legal, economic 
and political institutions, the other forces are less often recognized as part of 
political sovereignty’s undoing. These include the political rationalities of 
neoliberalism, transnational moral and legal discourses, along with 
activations of power related to, but not reducible to capital – those that traffic 
under the sign of culture, ideology and religion. Meanwhile forces sustaining 
or shoring up nation-state sovereignty are few and tend to be backward 
looking – for example, nationalism, despotism and imperialism. (Brown, 
2010, pp 22-3) 
Nation states have occupied a critical place as the creators and guarantors of the 
political, social and cultural conditions for neo-liberalisation and renewed capital 
accumulation: constructing consent, policing emergent crises and managing 
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contradictions (even while dismembering particular state apparatuses). At the 
core of this process has been the welfare state and Claus Offe’s famous 
contradiction: ‘The contradiction is that while capitalism cannot co-exist with, 
neither can it exist without, the welfare state’ (1984, p. 153; emphasis in the 
original). We have seen forty years of constant innovation – varieties of welfare 
reform and state reform – attempting to resolve this contradiction, creating new 
welfare apparatuses that are more disciplinary. Such reforms have developed 
models of ‘corporate welfare’ while making social welfare increasingly anti-social 
(responsibilising welfare, ‘do-it-yourself’ welfare and welfare as surveillance and 
scrutiny). Despite this, the contradiction persists, not least because of the glaring 
failures of neo-liberalisation, including growing inequality, social dislocation and 
the inability to meet the most basic human needs. As recent national-populist 
political movements have understood, people still look to nation states to provide 
support and well-being, even if these movements have constructed those desires 
in nationalist/nativist terms – welfare for ‘our people’. 
As a result, it is not surprising that so many current political projects – including 
Brexit – deal in this hyphenated complexity, offering to rescue both the nation-
as-people and the nation-as-state. These restorationist promises centre on a 
strange combination of ‘sovereignty’ and the ‘way of life’ associated with the 
people – they underpin the commitment to ‘make X great again’. These 
contemporary nationalisms come in different forms and imagine the 
rearrangement of the nation’s relationship to the global in different ways. Some 
claim to step out of the circuits of neoliberal globalisation by renegotiating the 
terms of membership or trade (such as Trump’s trade wars and attacks on multi-
lateral institutions such as the United Nations and International Criminal Court, 
for example). Others (Modi’s Hindu nationalism, for instance) seek an expanded 
place in the global economy. The UK’s Conservative government has offered a 
vision of a post-Brexit UK that transcends the narrow confines of Europe by leading 
a new era of global free trade: 
A truly Global Britain is possible, and it is in sight. And it should be no surprise 
that it is. Because we are the fifth biggest economy in the world. Since 2010 
we have grown faster than any economy in the G7. And we attract a fifth of 
all foreign investment in the EU. We are the biggest foreign investor in the 
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United States. We have more Nobel Laureates than any country outside 
America. We have the best intelligence services in the world, a military that 
can project its power around the globe, and friendships, partnerships and 
alliances in every continent. We have the greatest soft power in the world, 
we sit in exactly the right time zone for global trade, and our language is the 
language of the world. (May, 2016) 
Such projections of the post-Brexit future emerge in the contradictions of the 
fraught location occupied by the nation-state in the interstices of neo-liberal 
globalisation. They combine past, present and future in unsettling ways, locating 
past greatness alongside present debilitation and future triumph. 
Wendy Brown’s analysis (above) connects the experience of ‘waning sovereignty’ 
with the rise of ‘walled states’ and while the UK may not be engaged in the project 
of wall building, the withdrawal from the EU was demanded in familiar terms – 
notably the capacity to control ‘our own borders’. Sovereignty, as Gordon has 
argued, occupied a central but confusing place in the Leave campaign, involving 
a conflation of ‘internal’ sovereignty aspects (the constitutional location of 
sovereignty in parliament) and ‘external’ forms (the UK’s capacity to act as a state 
‘engaged in supranational and international systems and relationships’) (2016, 
p. 335). Such confusions have been politically and governmentally consequential 
in arguments about the proper location of sovereignty and about the composition 
of the nation, not least in relation to the border between the UK and the Republic 
of Ireland (and the EU). The chapter will come back to these issues later, but here 
it is important to draw a distinction between expert knowledge about constitutional 
questions and the political imagining of sovereignty as a site in which national 
virility and popular agency are condensed. Sovereignty in this sense is the bearer 
of potent fantasies about power – and powerful fantasies about potency. 
Imagining agency: ‘Take back control’ 
It may be productive to focus on one particular aspect of political-cultural fantasy 
that concerns the issue of agency – the central Brexit promise of ‘taking back 
control’. This promise was central to the campaign and to its capacity to mobilise 
a wide constituency of disaffected groups (see Jeremy Gilbert on ‘disaffected 
consent’, 2015). As the author has argued elsewhere, the Leave campaign was 
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able to articulate a variety of disaffections and senses of loss (Clarke, 
forthcoming). These include the economic dislocation of de-industrialisation 
(starting in the early 1980s); the cultural dislocation of the ‘way of life’ premised 
on full male employment in Fordist capitalism, in which work, family and the state 
(especially the welfare state) were articulated in what are now cast as ‘traditional’ 
ways (see, for example, Williams, 1989; Jessop, 1993; Clarke, 2013). Tzouvala 
suggests that the profound sense of loss can also be understood as a distinctively 
neoliberal ‘structure of feeling’ (even as it draws on multiple sources): ‘this real 
sense of “loss of control” is not only linked to the transfer of decision-making to 
supranational bodies, but also a direct consequence of the inherent logic of 
neoliberalism’ (2017, p. 122). Disaffections also involve the postcolonial 
melancholia noted earlier, in which that ‘way of life’ was bound up in intimate 
ways with a profoundly racialised sense of Britishness, and, perhaps more 
importantly, Englishness. In the moment of Brexit, the United Kingdom, Great 
Britain, Britishness and Englisnhess performed endless substitutions, with the 
precise reference slipping and sliding. Frustrations also piled up around a sense of 
being ignored by the political classes, intensified by the willingness of those 
leaders to distribute misery through post-2008 austerity policies (see Chapters 
Montgomery and Grasso, Mckenzie, and Morelli). Equally significant were the 
multiple feelings of loss and displacement associated with social and political and 
cultural changes associated with a range of ‘equality’ projects – around gender, 
sexuality and race. It is no coincidence that older white men were at the core of 
the ‘rage’ expressed in the Vote Leave campaign. 
David Cameron’s ill-advised choice to propose a referendum on the EU 
encountered this maelstrom of disaffections – the decision itself a perverse 
confirmation of how ‘out of touch’ the political classes had become. The political 
form of the referendum loosened established political affiliations and simplified 
matters into the binary Yes/No vote. It created the possibility of these disaffections 
finding a voice. More precisely, the Leave campaign offered a very selective 
voicing of disaffection, ventriloquising some varieties and ignoring or silencing 
others, particularly those about the degradation of waged work, the de-
socialisation of public life, and the self-inflicted diminished capacity of the state to 
protect and support those in need. What ‘taking back control’ signified was the 
possibility of a form of collective agency – seized on by those who felt themselves 
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‘powerless’ in political terms. Insa Koch (2017) has argued that the referendum 
was ‘a chance to reject government tout court and to say no to a system of 
representative democracy that many have come to experience in punitive terms’. 
At the heart of the Brexit question, then, is this fantastic projection of individual 
and collective agency – the sense that control could be taken back, could be 
exercised and could be brandished in the faces of those who – in some form or 
another – had taken control away from ‘us’. In these ways, the Leave campaign – 
and its potent slogan – offered a prospect of political agency: the chance to act 
effectively to bring about change and to redress grievances. The long and 
profoundly disenchanting rule of neo-liberalising governments of whatever party 
alienated many from formal political processes, as measured in declining electoral 
turnout and party membership. As William Davis (2016) has argued, the slogan 
itself was central to this promise of agency: 
In this context, the slogan ‘take back control’ was a piece of political genius. 
It worked on every level between the macroeconomic and the 
psychoanalytic. Think of what it means on an individual level to 
rediscover control. To be a person without control (for instance to suffer 
incontinence or a facial tick) is to be the butt of cruel jokes, to be potentially 
embarrassed in public. It potentially reduces one’s independence. What was 
so clever about the language of the Leave campaign was that it spoke directly 
to this feeling of inadequacy and embarrassment, then promised to eradicate 
it. The promise had nothing to do with economics or policy, but everything 
to do with the psychological allure of autonomy and self-respect. Farrage’s 
[sic] political strategy was to take seriously communities who’d otherwise 
been taken for granted for much of the past 50 years. 
While the fantasy of individual and collective agency is encapsulated in the very 
act of ‘taking’, the other two terms of the promise, ‘back’ and ‘control’, are more 
ambiguous. Many of the issues that swirled around the moment of Brexit have 
never been the subject of popular, nor even parliamentary, control. Most evidently 
missing from the list of liberal democracy’s sites of citizen or popular control is 
economic democracy – the state of the UK economy (and its uneven social 
consequences) has haunted every discussion of Brexit but the question of control 
remained mute. How was control to be exercised over the City of London and the 
 8 
flows of finance capital, or the ‘British’ car industry (largely foreign-owned) or 
even those generators of the ‘new economy’, such as Amazon, Uber and the like? 
Equally, if ‘taking back’ implied a history of power exercised by the people, then 
this is a rather idiosyncratic reading of British history, in which both the economy 
and the state have proved remarkably resistant to popular control. In a rather 
different way, the question of the sites, forms and effectivity of ‘control’ has 
become increasingly tangled in the aftermath of the referendum. Instead, it might 
be useful to consider the fantasy of agency promised in the referendum as one of 
those characteristic ‘magical solutions’ to which popular politics – and popular 
culture – have been prone. 
The concept of magical solutions has played a significant role in cultural studies: 
for example, in Hall and Jefferson (1976), the idea was used to talk about youth 
subcultures wrestling with pressing contradictions in working class experience but 
being only able to find resolutions to them in the realm of the symbolic. In the 
case of Brexit, the promised resolution to the accumulating experiences of 
disempowerment, disaffection and despair may also have failed to materially 
resolve the problems of control. The one-shot exercise of agency in the 
referendum vote has, so far, proved frustrating in many registers, generating both 
renewed despair and unleashing new waves of frustration and anger among both 
Brexiteers and Remainers. 
Making Brexit mean Brexit? Time, space and sovereignty 
When the result of the referendum was confirmed, Nigel Farage celebrated by 
describing it as the UK’s ‘Independence Day’: 
We have broken free from a failing political union. We have managed, the 
little people, the ordinary people who have ignored all the threats that have 
come from big business and big politics and it has been a huge, amazing 
exercise in democracy. (Nigel Farage, 24 June 2016) 
However, it has been a difficult – and as yet unfinished – transition to 
independence; difficulties that other independence projects have previously 
encountered. The attempt to make Brexit come true in practice has occurred at 
the uncomfortable intersection of two very different types of temporality. On the 
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one hand, the promise of Brexit was articulated in what Pierre-André Taguieff has 
described as the distinctive temporality of populism, in which historical time is 
replaced by a continuous and immediate present, embodied in a promise to efface 
‘any distance between all desires and their realisation’ (2007, p. 16; the author’s 
translation). Here we can see the temporality of Farage’s proclaimed 
‘Independence Day’ and the recurring insistence that Brexit must be delivered, no 
matter what obstacles might appear. 
On the other hand, there has been a return to what might be called ‘political-
governmental time’ in which treaties need to be remade, negotiations need to be 
conducted, economic and political relationships need to be reconstructed and 
timetables, schedules and plans need to be established. Suddenly, the promise of 
immediate liberation became enmeshed in the different temporality of institutional 
or governmental politics. Moving from the Brexit vote to Britain’s departure from 
the EU has involved dismantling existing institutionalised formations, embedded 
in treaties, maps, legislation, governmental ordering, sets of habituated 
relationships, practices and places, and forms of affiliation and attachment. Brexit 
required the enactment and instantiation of the desired new order in the same 
registers of institutionalisation and normalisation. 
All of these insert a form of historical time between the referendum vote and the 
materialisation of the decision in a new ordering of things. Time, in this sense, is 
intrinsic to the worlds of policy and politics, even though it may also be used as a 
device for the management of policy and politics (Pollitt, 2008). Frustrated 
Brexiteers have recurrently accused ‘enemies of the people’ of using time (delay, 
blocking, foot-dragging, etc.) as a means to deflect, or at least delay, the UK’s 
exit from the EU. This may well be true, but the populist desire for immediate 
consummation seems ill-equipped to deal with political-governmental time – and 
points to a landscape of further disaffection. In the process, it might be noted, the 
central populist ideas of ‘the people’ shrinks to include only those who voted to 
leave: the true believers, the real people (see Chapter Guderjan and Wilding). 
The efforts to make Brexit materialise have produced new disorders of space, scale 
and sovereignty as multiple social, political, governmental and constitutional 
problems have emerged. In this context, this chapter will only touch on the 
question of how united the United Kingdom might be, which is picked upon in 
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other contributions to this volume. The UK has always been a complex political 
and constitutional formation that combines four political-cultural spaces: England, 
Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. In the last twenty years, that formation 
became more complicated through power-sharing arrangements in the north of 
Ireland which softened the border between the North and the Republic of Ireland, 
and through the creation of forms of devolved government in Scotland and Wales.  
Brexit has unsettled the spatial and scalar arrangements of the UK in several ways. 
First, it marked a degree of political-cultural separation between England and 
Wales on the one hand where majorities voted Leave, and Scotland and Northern 
Ireland which both supported Remain. The effects of these divisions have been 
visible in discontent about the perceived effects of English dominance of the UK 
(see Chapter Stolz). The spatial and scalar problems of maintaining a union 
become more complex still in the case of Northern Ireland (see Chapter Birrell and 
Carmichael). One outcome of the peace process in the 1990s was the erasure of 
the former ‘hard border’ between the North and the Republic (see, for example, 
Gilmore, 2017). All three governments involved, the UK, the Republic of Ireland 
and the parties of the Northern Ireland Assembly, have been reluctant to restore 
a ‘hard border’ between the UK and the EU. Yet control of ‘our borders’ forms a 
central promise of the Leave campaign’s imagining of sovereignty. 
It is, indeed, the issue of sovereignty that has proved most disorderly after Brexit. 
The referendum produced much political turmoil, not least in contests over the 
leadership of the Conservative, Labour and UKIP parties. The Conservative Party 
in government found itself the inheritor of the result and its new leader, Theresa 
May, announced that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ in the face of political disaffection 
within her own party, as well as within parliament more widely. The government 
would act, she insisted, to trigger Article 50 (the legal device to begin 
disentangling the UK and the EU), but this announcement produced a 
constitutional conflict about the form and location of sovereignty. This came to 
centre on whether it was the government or parliament that could trigger Article 
50, with the Prime Minister insisting that it was the government’s choice while 
many MPs and legal commentators argued that it was a decision for parliament. 
In a dramatic intervention, an entrepreneur and philanthropist, Gina Miller, led a 
campaign that sought a judicial review of this issue. The Supreme Court 
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adjudicated in 2017 that constitutional sovereignty (in the capacity to trigger the 
Article dissociating the UK from the EU) was embodied in parliament – a decision 
that led to accusations of treason against both the judges and those who brought 
the case – notably the evidently ‘unBritish’ Gina Miller. Miller attracted much 
hostility. She was subjected to death and rape threats, castigated as a member 
of the liberal/cosmopolitan London elite and attacked for not being British, despite 
holding British citizenship, not least from the 4th Viscount St Davids: 
Rhodri Philipps, the 4th Viscount St Davids, was jailed on July 13 for writing 
a number of racially and abusive posts [sic] on Facebook. One post read: 
“£5,000 for the first person to ‘accidentally’ run over this bloody troublesome 
first generation immigrant.” Philipps, of Knightsbridge, central London, also 
called her a “f---ing boat jumper” four days after Ms Miller, 52, won a 
landmark High Court challenge against the Government. (The Telegraph, 
2017) 
Meanwhile, the three judges who made the ruling were denounced as ‘enemies of 
the people’, who were thwarting the popular will. In one of the more 
constitutionally accurate, if politically puzzling, twists, they were also criticized for 
being ‘unelected’. 
Much of this attack was led by sections of the tabloid press, who have identified a 
rich stream of popular rage to be tapped in the fantasy of ‘sovereignty’. The 
singularity of Brexit – ‘Brexit means Brexit’ – is passionately defended as the ‘Will 
of the People’ and this is articulated in the same populist/anti-elitist register 
developed in the campaign. This ‘muscular populism’ denounces any attempt to 
undermine the ‘popular will’ in a recurrently racist and misogynistic repertoire. It 
deploys a repertoire of vitalist masculine tropes: inviting opponents to ‘stop 
whining’, ‘suck it up’, ‘grow some balls’ and so on. Those identified by the tabloid 
press as the ‘Remoaners’ are pictured as willing to try any ploy to defeat, delay or 
deflect the decision to leave. In this process, the governmental complexity of 
locating and enacting sovereignty is trumped by the clarion declaration that ‘we 
won’. 
The negotiation of governmental complexity (and governmental time) against this 
populist simplification and its temporality remains a central site of contestation – 
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and one of the terrains of potential political mobilisation. Different temporalities 
thus form one strand of the complexities of the long drawn out moment of Brexit, 
wonderfully summarised by Bob Jessop in the following:  
Brexit is so polyvalent a notion and so complex a process that its present 
meaning is hard to define and its future trajectory hard to discern. Over the 
next two to three years, we are likely to observe a process akin to a three-
dimensional chess game with many participants and even more stakeholders 
playing according to uncertain rules open to contested renegotiation. 
(Jessop, 2017, p. 129) 
Beyond fantasy: collective agency and the problem of 
politics 
Treating the promise to ‘take back control’ as a fantasy of collective agency is 
linked to the question of political futures and to the issue of how the felt ‘loss of 
control’ has been and might be mobilised. Gerbaudo has posed this question in 
terms of how the return of sovereignty returns issues of collective power to the 
political agenda: 
The return en auge of the question of sovereignty in current political debates 
bespeaks the profound crisis of neoliberalism, and the way its agony and the 
connected opening of a post-neoliberal horizon, is reviving demands for 
collective control over politics and society. (Gerbaudo, 2016) 
While accepting his framing of the question, this chapter suggests two possible – 
and diametrically opposed – lines of potential development. The first builds on the 
current right-wing mobilisations of power and control, linking them to regressive 
and exclusivist notions of sovereignty in which the search to restore past powers 
– and glories – is the dominant framing. The problematic dynamic of these moves 
concerns the likely frustrations, failures and unfulfilled promises of such 
programmes, possibly intensifying the senses of loss. This might be fertile ground 
for a new anti-politics in which the people come to feel betrayed or abandoned by 
another political leadership, confirming their disaffection from politics all over 
again. Neither resentful immobilisation nor the potential search for a ‘strong man’ 
who claims to transcend politics are attractive prospects. 
 13 
The alternative is the development of a progressive politics of popular sovereignty 
that took the search for collective power and control seriously – and extended its 
reach into the hitherto insulated or resistant domains of society, not least the 
economy. Attending to economic exclusion, dispossession and its unevenly 
distributed effects (from private wealth to degraded public services) might be a 
terrain on which a longer term politics of democratic agency might be developed 
whose range could extend well beyond the economic, transforming the 
institutionalised systems of power and inequality in the process. It might even 
bring about an expansive and inclusive conception of ‘the people’ and the popular. 
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